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Abstract
Clearinghouses are the centerpiece of global policymakers’ 2009
framework of reforms in the over-the-counter derivative markets in
response to the 2007–08 financial crisis. Dodd-Frank’s Title VII
implemented these reforms in the U.S. More than ten years have now
passed since the establishment of this framework. Yet much work
continues on outstanding issues surrounding the recovery and
resolution of a distressed or insolvent clearinghouse. This Article
examines one of these issues: the possibility of clearinghouse
shareholders raising no creditor worse off than in liquidation claims
in resolution. It argues that such claims are nonsensical and should
be unavailable to clearinghouse shareholders. This would decrease
moral hazard in and promote the rationalization of the global
clearing ecosystem for derivatives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the 2007–08 financial crisis, global policymakers
established a framework of reforms for the $559 trillion1 over-the-counter
(OTC) derivative markets.2 The mandated use of clearinghouses3—also
known as CCPs—by standardized (commoditized) OTC derivatives were
at the center of these changes.4 Indeed, it “has become the symbol of
response to the Great Financial Crisis” in these markets.5 In the U.S., Title
VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

1 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, GLOBAL OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET: FOREIGN
EXCHANGE, INTEREST RATE, EQUITY-LINKED CONTRACTS table D5.1,
http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/d5.1 (last updated Mar. 12, 2020).
2 See Press Release, G20, Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (Sept. 25, 2009)
(available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7g20/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_ 250909.pdf); see also Colleen
Baker, Incomplete Clearinghouse Mandates, 56 AM. BUS. L. J. 507 (2019) (providing
background on why clearinghouses became the centerpiece of reforms to OTC derivative
markets).
3 There are several different types of clearinghouses and important differences exist
among them. In this Article, “clearinghouse” or “CCP” should be understood as referring
to a central counterparty clearinghouse for derivatives.
4 Ron Berndsen, Five Fundamental Questions on Central Counterparties (Tilburg University
Center Discussion Paper No. 2020-028, 2020). Globally, there are approximately 60
clearinghouses, which clear a variety of financial instruments (securities, repurchase
agreements, derivatives). Id. at 2.
5 Id. at 29.
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(Dodd-Frank) implemented these reforms.6 Yet, clearinghouses already
had a long history in financial markets. More than a century ago,
derivatives market participants had developed this ingenious institution.7
Clearinghouses promote transactional efficiencies in the post-trade
process and manage counterparty credit risk. Today, especially given the
global clearing mandates, clearinghouses have become “super-systemic”
financial market infrastructures.8
In November 2020, the Financial Stability Board (FSB)9
released Guidance on Financial Resources to Support CCP Resolution and on the
Treatment of CCP Equity in Resolution (Guidance).10 Although
clearinghouses have proven to be robust risk management institutions,
they can and have failed.11 Indeed, in September 2018, a NASDAQ
clearinghouse was at the center of events that “shook the world’s financial
system.”12 Given the risk of clearinghouse distress or insolvency, global

6 Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203
(2010).
7 See generally Randall S. Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk?: The
Development of Derivatives Clearinghouses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations, 31 J. MONEY,
CREDIT AND BANKING 596 (1999).
8 Letter from Sir Paul Tucker, Chair, Systemic Risk Council to Randal K. Quarles,
Chairman, Financial Stability Board: Bank for International Settlements (July 31, 2020)
[hereinafter “The Systemic Risk Council Letter”] (available at https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/Systemic-Risk-Council-2.pdf).
9 See FIN. STABILITY BD., https://www.fsb.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2020)
(describing the Financial Stability Board as “an international body that monitors and
makes recommendations about the global financial system”).
10 See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., GUIDANCE ON FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO
SUPPORT CCP RESOLUTION AND ON THE TREATMENT OF CCP EQUITY IN RESOLUTION
(2020) (available at https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P161120-1.pdf).
11 See JON GREGORY, CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES: MANDATORY CLEARING AND
BILATERAL MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR OTC DERIVATIVES 267–70 (2014) (providing
that these failures include the Caisse de Liquidation in France in 1974, the Kuala Lumpur
Commodity Clearing House in Malaysia in 1983, and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange
Clearing Corporation in Hong Kong in 1987); see also id. at 269 (noting that Professor
Craig Pirrong states that “[i]t is probably fair to say that the CCPs [clearinghouses] of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) and the
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) were very close to failure and only prompt action from
the Federal Reserve prevented a catastrophe (Pirrong 2013).”); Berndsen, supra note 4, at
25 (providing a table illustrating the “four historical cases of CCP stress,” where stress is
defined as the exhausting of the default waterfall with outstanding losses).
12 Jack Ewing & Milan Schreuer, How a Lone Norwegian Trader Shook the World’s
Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2019, at BU1.
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policymakers and international bodies such as the FSB are focused on
clearinghouse resolution as demonstrated by the Guidance.
The Guidance notes the possibility of clearinghouse shareholders
raising “no creditor worse off than in liquidation” (“NCWOL”) claims in
a clearinghouse resolution.13 Yet, shareholders are not creditors. This
Article argues that such claims for clearinghouse shareholders are
nonsensical14 and should not be available. Shareholders are neither
creditors nor are clearinghouses banks. Extending NCWOL claims to
clearinghouse shareholders would increase moral hazard and miss an
opportunity to promote the rationalization of the global clearing
ecosystem for derivatives.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief primer on
clearinghouses, recovery, and resolution. It also reviews the different types
of losses a clearinghouse could experience and the two predominant types
of ownership structures of these institutions. Both considerations are
integral to the possibility of shareholders making NCWOL claims in a
clearinghouse resolution. Part II explores NCWOL claims, why
clearinghouse shareholders might assert such claims in resolution, and the
Guidance’s discussion of this issue. Part III argues that NCWOL claims
for clearinghouse shareholders are nonsensical and should be unavailable.
The Article then concludes.
II. PART I: A BRIEF PRIMER ON CLEARINGHOUSES,
RECOVERY, & RESOLUTION
A. The Rational for and a Description of Clearinghouses
After a financial trade is made, a post-trade process known as clearing
and settlement begins. To settle securities trades, there must be an
exchange of the security and the payment amount. However, derivatives
contracts frequently require that after a trade is made, payments between
the counterparties be exchanged throughout its term (tenor). While
securities contracts typically settle within a few days, the lifetime of a
FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 10, at 8.
Note that the Futures Industry Association and the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association have stated: “Under US regulation, CCP equity is not subject to
the NCWOL safeguard.” See FUTURES INDUS. ASS’N ET AL., FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO
SUPPORT CCP RESOLUTION AND THE TREATMENT OF CCP EQUITY IN RESOLUTION 3–
4 (2020) (available at https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FIA-IIF-ISDA-1.pdf).
13
14
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derivatives contract could be years. For example, many credit default swaps
have five-year terms. Indeed, a derivative contract’s term is “essential to the
contract . . . the fundamental economic purpose of a derivatives transaction
involves the reciprocal obligations of the parties over the life of the
contract.”15 Hence, counterparty credit risk—the risk that a party to a
derivatives contract will default on its obligations prior to the expiration
of the contract’s term—is a significant concern for market participants.
Clearinghouses are designed to ameliorate counterparty credit risk
through multiple layers of financial resources. They also promote
transactional efficiencies through the multilateral netting of trading
positions, allowing members to make net rather than gross payments to
the clearinghouse, implementing strict collateralization,16 and centralizing
standards for and the monitoring of members’ financial condition. Figure
1 below illustrates the difference between bilateral clearing and
settlement—when trading counterparties make their own arrangements
for the clearing and settlement of their derivatives contracts—versus the
use of a clearinghouse. In this figure, A, B, and C represent market
participants engaged in derivatives trading. The top diagram illustrates
bilateral clearing and settlement.
The two bottom diagrams in Figure 1 illustrate market participants’
use of a clearinghouse. Here, A, B, and C are clearing members or members
of the clearinghouse. When A (“buyer”) and B (“seller”) clear their trade
through a clearinghouse, the clearinghouse essentially steps into the
middle of the trade through contractual novation. It becomes the buyer
to the seller (B) and the seller to the buyer (A). Hence, the clearinghouse
holds offsetting positions and does not have market risk as long as its
members are not in default. It is critical to understand that the original
counterparties—A and B—no longer have legal obligations or direct
counterparty credit exposure to each other in terms of their original trade.
Both A and B must make any payments they owe on their derivatives
contracts to the clearinghouse, and the clearinghouse must make any
payments it owes on the positions it holds to A or B. Membership in a
clearinghouse requires that a market participant meet certain financial
requirements and consent to ongoing monitoring of its financial condition
15 Robert R. Bliss & Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and Settlement: A
Comparison of Central Counterparties and Alternative Structures, 30 FED. RSRV. BANK CHI.
ECON. 22, 23 (2006) (emphasis added).
16 See Craig Pirrong, A Bill of Goods: CCPs and Systemic Risk, 2 J. FIN. MKT.
INFRASTRUCTURES 55 (2014).
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by the clearinghouse. Clearinghouse members must also post initial margin
(a performance bond), generally make daily variation margin payments,
and contribute to a common default fund.
Figure 117

Clearinghouses clear different types of derivatives with different risk
profiles. Figure 2 illustrates a typical clearinghouse default waterfall of
financial resources. Clearinghouse rulebooks, which are specific to each
institution, delineate the contractual arrangement between the
clearinghouse and its members. They specify the order in which the
financial resources in the default waterfall are to be used in the event of a
clearing member’s default.18 Were a member to default, its payment
obligations, such as any variation margin owed, must be covered and its
trading portfolio hedged and auctioned to return the clearinghouse to a
market neutral position (offsetting positions). In general, clearinghouses
first use the defaulted member’s initial margin and default fund
contribution to cover its outstanding obligations. If this amount is

Ivana Ruffini, Central Clearing: Risks and Customer Protections, 39 FED. RSRV. BANK
CHI. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 90, 92 (2015).
18 See Colleen Baker, Clearinghouses for Over-the-Counter Derivatives 42–43 (Nov. 1, 2016)
(unnumbered working paper) (on file with The Volker Alliance) (providing that more
than one clearing member could default at the same time; regulations for systemically
significant clearinghouses in the U.S. require the default fund to meet a “Cover 2”
standard, meaning that it would have enough financial resources to cover the default of
its two largest clearing members).
17
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insufficient, there could be a thin layer of capital contributed by the
clearinghouse to cover any obligations still outstanding.19
Historically, clearing members were also the owners of the
clearinghouse. Today, most clearinghouses—for example, ICE Clear
Credit and CME Clearing—are part of publicly-traded, global exchange
group behemoths, such as Intercontinental Exchange and CME Group,
respectively, rather than member-owned institutions. However, clearing
members are still primarily responsible for losses resulting from the default
of a clearing member as Figure 2 illustrates. This arrangement has been
termed “incomplete demutualization.”20 It creates a fundamental conflict
of interest between clearinghouse shareholders whose primary interest is
profits and clearing members whose primary interest is risk management.21
In the case of publicly traded clearinghouses, risk does not follow reward.
The unique arrangement of allocating most default losses to customers
also violates basic principles of corporate finance.22
Once any clearinghouse capital in the default waterfall is exhausted,
the clearinghouse will use the remaining member funds in the common
default fund in an attempt to cover any remaining obligations.23 If the
clearinghouse exhausts the resources in its default fund, it has reached the

See ANGELA ARMAKOLLA & BENEDETTA BIACHI, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL
COUNTERPARTY (CCP) ECOSYSTEM 10–13 (May 2017) (available at
https://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb46za.pdf) (noting that some jurisdictions, for
example the E.U., require that shareholder-owned clearinghouses contribute a specified
amount of capital to their default waterfall); see also Baker, supra note 18, at 43 (noting that
others, for example the U.S., do not; in practice, however, most shareholder-owned
clearinghouses do contribute some capital to the default waterfall); see, e.g., Press Release,
ABN AMRO Clearing et al., A Path Forward for CCP Resilience, Recovery, and
Resolution (March 10, 2020), (available at https://www.goldmansachs.com/mediarelations/press-releases/current/multimedia/ccp-paper-2020.pdf); see Berndsen, supra
note 4, at 28 (providing that economists have commented that these amounts “in
practice… cannot quantitatively be considered as a meaningful loss-absorbing
component given its small size”).
20 Robert Cox & Robert Steigerwald, “Incomplete Demutualization” and Financial Market
Infrastructure: Central Counterparty Ownership and Governance After the Crisis of 2008-09, 4 J.
FIN. MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES 25 (2016).
21 See FUTURES INDUS. ASS’N ET AL., supra note 14.
22 Id. at 3.
23 See Berndsen, supra note 4, at 23.
19
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“end of the waterfall.”24 At this point, the clearinghouse is in distress25 and
the recovery process begins.26
Figure 227

B. Clearinghouse Recovery and Resolution
Clearinghouse recovery is a process somewhat akin to a private debt
restructuring and should be provided for in the rulebook.28 Professor Ron
Berndsen explains that “[t]he three main elements of recovery are: 1)
restore the matched book after a default (as the CCP still has part or all of
the portfolios of the defaulter(s); 2) allocate remaining default losses with
in general three possible candidates for absorbing those losses: the CCP,
the surviving clearing members and the taxpayer; and 3) cover liquidity
shortfalls that may arise[.]”29 Rulebooks generally permit the clearinghouse
to make at least one, if not more, “cash calls” to members for additional
capital.30 However, this amount could still be insufficient to cover default
losses or not be paid by members in a timely fashion. Additionally, various
tools such as reduction (haircutting) of variation margin gains, full or
partial tear up of contracts, and allocation of the defaulted member’s
Id. at 5.
Id. at 23.
26 Id. at 24.
27 Louise Carter & Megan Garner, Skin in the Game—Central Counterparty Risk Controls
and Incentives, RSRV. BANK AUSTL. BULLETIN, June 2015, at 79, 82 (available at
https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2015/jun/pdf/bu-0615-9.pdf).
28 Berndsen, supra note 4, at 24.
29 Id. at 24.
30 Id. at 26.
24
25
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positions to another member can also, in theory, be used.31 However,
concerns exist about the potential impact of these tools on financial
market stability.
If the recovery process were unsuccessful, the clearinghouse would be
resolved or wound down (liquidated).32 Resolution is analogous to a formal
bankruptcy filing as resolution authorities (RAs) assume partial or
complete control of the clearinghouse.33 The RA might even intervene
prior to the exhaustion of the recovery process, especially in the case of a
systemically significant clearinghouse.34
C. Allocation of Default and Non-Default Losses
Clearinghouse losses can also result from non-default issues
(cybersecurity problems, investment35 or custody losses, operational issues,
etc.) or a combination of both default and non-default issues.36 In the case
of a member-owned clearinghouse, the source of the losses (default, nondefault, or a combination) is unimportant to the question of financial
responsibility. Members, as shareholders, will be responsible for both.
However, who is responsible for non-default losses, and which types,
becomes extremely important in the case of a clearinghouse within a
publicly traded exchange group infrastructure. Remarkably, there is a lack
of clarity about this issue and it is currently a subject of much
controversy.37 Moreover, how contemporaneous default and non-default
losses would be divided, and the respective loss allocation made between
shareholders and members is completely unclear and likely impossible to
clarify.38

See id. 24–27.
See id. at 27.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See id. at 14 (providing that clearing member collateral can be invested in a variety
of ways, including “reverse repos, central bank deposit, commercial bank deposit and
high-quality asset purchases”).
36 See id. at 22.
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Sir John Dermot Turing, Response: Guidance on Financial Resources to Support
CCP Resolution, FIN. STABILITY BD. 1, 2 (July 28, 2020) (commenting “[i]t should be
stressed that a pure distinction between ‘default’ and ‘non-default’ losses is not
achievable”).
31
32
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Not surprisingly, clearing members of a publicly traded clearinghouse
generally object to any obligation to cover non-default losses,39 with the
possible exception by some of custody, settlement, or investment losses if
the member has a choice about, or control over, such decisions.40
Clearinghouses argue it would be against standard market practice to make
them insurers in these areas and liable for losses due to a third-party’s
action.41 Some clearinghouses have argued that non-default loss allocation
should be based upon a balance between decision control and receipt of
benefits.42
If clearinghouses were owned by their members, as they were
historically, issues about loss allocation and the fundamental conflict of
interest between shareholders’ profit motive and members’ risk
management focus would be ameliorated. Due to these considerations,
some scholars have argued that clearinghouses should return to member
ownership.43 However, an alternative to the remutualization of
clearinghouses would be to hold clearinghouses responsible for any default
losses that exceeded the defaulting member’s initial margin and defund
fund contribution, and for all non-default losses (with the possible
exception of custody, settlement, and investment losses). From the
perspective of this Article, this would be a more sensible arrangement.

Memorandum from Allianz Glob. Investors et al. on A Path Forward for CCP
Resilience, Recovery, and Resolution 6 (Oct. 24, 2019) (available at https://www.goldm
ansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases/current/multimedia/ccp-paper.pdf)
(providing “[i]t is generally not appropriate for clearing members or end-users to bear
these NDLs since they are not responsible for the choices that led to them”).
40 FUTURES INDUS. ASS’N ET AL., supra note 14, at 12.
41 See, e.g., Memorandum from Fin. Stability Bd. on Public Responses to Consultation
on Guidance on Financial Resources to Support CCP Resolution and on the Treatment
of CCP Equity in Resolution (Aug. 10, 2020) (available at https://www.fsb.org/2020/0
8/public-responses-to-consultation-on-guidance-on-financial-resources-to-support-ccpresolution-and-on-the-treatment-of-ccp-equity-in-resolution) (providing file links to
responses by exchanges and clearinghouses such as the Options Clearing Corporation,
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Intercontinental Exchange, the World Federation of
Exchanges, and CCP12 to the FSB’s Guidance).
42 LONDON STOCK EXCH. GRP., Response to FSB Guidance on Financial Resources to
Support CCP Resolution and on the Treatment of CCP Equity in Resolution, FIN. STABILITY BD.
1, 2 (July 31, 2020).
43 See, e.g., Colleen M. Baker, Incomplete Clearinghouse Mandates, supra note 1;
Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When “Skin in the Game” Is Not Enough, the
Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. REG. 601 (2017).
39
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The author is unaware of other examples in the marketplace in which
the customers (clearing members) of a publicly traded institution, rather
than its shareholders, are responsible for losses created by the business or
other customers. Commentators have also argued for clearinghouses being
a “regular part of a market economy”44 and suggested that:
[i]f owners object to putting their equity at risk, then they
should not own for-profit entities, which take huge notional
counterparty-credit exposures and other financial risks. Instead,
they could have a contractual relationship where they receive a
fee for providing operational services rather than, as now, the
excess cash flows and profits of the clearing houses they run.45

Indeed, were these recommendations followed, this Article and the second
part of the Guidance would be moot.
III. PART II: NCWOL CLAIMS FOR CLEARINGHOUSE SHAREHOLDERS?
A. NCWOL Claims
What then would a NCWOL claim be and what is the argument for
the possibility of clearinghouse shareholders asserting such claims in
resolution? As a preliminary matter, the acronym “NCWOL” stands for
“no creditor worse off than in liquidation.” Note the absence of the word
“shareholder.”
The NCWOL principle originated in the bank resolution context46 and
international jurisdictions have varied in their application of the idea.47
The principle addresses scenarios in which bank regulators resolve a failing
bank by transferring the bank’s assets and some of its liabilities to a
“good” or bridge bank and leaving some liabilities in the “bad” or failed
bank.48 As a result, similarly situated creditors are likely to receive divergent
treatment if some creditors retain claims on assets transferred to the
“good” or bridge bank while others are left-behind in the failed bank and
suffer extensive losses.49 The NCWOL safeguard aims to ensure “that the
The Systemic Risk Council Letter, supra note 8, at 3.
Id.
46 See FUTURES INDUS. ASS’N ET AL., supra note 14, at 4.
47 David Ramos & Javier Solana, Bank Resolution and Creditor Distribution: The Tension
Shaping Global Banking–Part I: “External and Intra-Group Funding” and “Ex Ante planning v.
Ex Post Execution” Dimensions, 28 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 27–29 (2019).
48 See FUTURES INDUS. ASS’N ET AL., supra note 14, at 20.
49 Id.
44
45
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left-behind creditors would receive at least what they would have received
in liquidation [which] decrease[s] the likelihood of their challenging the
resolution plan.”50
In the U.S., the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)—the
regulatory agency responsible for resolving failed banks—is permitted to
treat similarly situated creditors differently so long as doing so both meets
certain statutory objectives and ensures all creditors receive at least the
liquidation value of their claims.51
What then is the argument for the possibility of clearinghouse
shareholders asserting NCWOL claims in resolution? If a systemically
important clearinghouse were to become distressed, it would attempt to
regain stability and return to a matched book (offsetting positions)
through the recovery process outlined in its rulebook. Ideally, it would
succeed and resume normal operations. If the recovery process failed, an
RA would intervene to resolve or wind down the clearinghouse.
Alternatively, an RA might intervene prior to the completion of the
recovery process to ensure continuity of the clearinghouse’s operations
and to promote financial market stability. As systemically significant
clearinghouses are too interconnected and critical to fail, this possibility is
highly foreseeable. Although clearinghouses and market participants have
asked that RAs clarify the timing of resolution intervention, 52 thus far, this
remains unclear. If the RA were to intervene prior to a failed recovery
process, the RA’s actions in the resolution process could ultimately result
in clearinghouse shareholders experiencing larger losses than “in
liquidation under the applicable insolvency regime.” 53
Clearinghouse rulebooks primarily allocate default losses to clearing
members rather than shareholders.54 However, the RA’s actions could
deviate from these rulebook measures and require clearinghouse equity to
absorb losses before arrangements provided for by the recovery process
had been exhausted. Most clearing members are themselves systemically
significant institutions. Their financial condition would also be critical to

Id. at 4.
Ramos & Solana, supra note 47, at 27 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5390(b)(4)).
52 See, e.g., Letter from Chris Edmonds, Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (July 31,
2020) (on file with Fin. Stability Bd.) (stating that “resolution authority actions should be
agreed ex ante and defined in rulebooks”).
53 FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 10.
54 Id.
50
51
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financial market stability, so the possibility of an RA deviating from the
rulebook to promote financial stability is highly foreseeable.
If the rulebook’s recovery arrangements, in which clearing members
are likely largely responsible for default losses and at least some nondefault losses, are enforceable in insolvency in a particular jurisdiction,
there is a concern that deviations by the RA from the rulebook’s
arrangements could “enable equity holders to raise NCWOL claims” as
discussed in the Guidance.55 However, some market participants have
argued that in bankruptcy, the clearinghouse’s loss allocation “measures
could not be applied as a legal matter.”56
B. The Guidance and NCWOL Claims for Shareholders
The Guidance is divided into two parts. The first part addresses
“[a]ssessing the adequacy of financial resources to support CCP
resolution”57 through a five-step process. The second part focuses on the
“[t]reatment of CCP equity in resolution.”58 The possibility of
clearinghouse shareholders asserting NCWOL claims in resolution is one
aspect of this topic.
Part II of the Guidance refers to several prior FSB documents: the Key
attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions (Key Attributes),59
Appendix II-Annex 1 of the Key Attributes (FMI Annex),60 and Guidance
on central counterparty resolution and resolution planning (FSB 2017).61 It notes
that a resolution principle set out by all three is “to provide mechanisms
enabling shareholders and creditors to absorb losses in a manner that
respects the hierarchy of claims in liquidation.”62 It also notes a principle

Id.
See FUTURES INDUS. ASS’N ET AL., supra note 14 (stating as an example “the
counterfactual would presumably require the assumption that a CCP’s default fund
assessments had been called and paid, but a CCP’s rules may provide that its authority to
call or require funding of assessments terminates upon its bankruptcy”).
57 FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 10.
58 Id.
59 FIN. STABILITY BD., Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions
(2014), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf.
60 Id.
61 FIN. STABILITY BD., GUIDANCE ON CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY RESOLUTION
AND RESOLUTION PLANNING (2017) (available at https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P050717-1.pdf).
62 FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 10.
55
56
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of the Key Attributes: that in resolution, “CCP should be fully loss
absorbing” and “should absorb losses first.” However, it adds that:
the Key Attributes also include a safeguard for creditors as a
right of compensation where they do not receive at a minimum
what they would have received in liquidation of the CCP under
the applicable insolvency regime (NCWOL safeguard). Further,
the FMI Annex provides that, for the purpose of determining
NCWOL for participants, the assessment of losses should
assume the full application of the CCP’s rules and procedures
for loss allocation. The FSB 2017 Guidance provides that the
assessment of whether participants, equity holders and creditors
have been made worse off than in liquidation should assume, in
accordance with applicable insolvency law, the full application
of the CCP’s rules and arrangements and any other contractual
agreements.63

The Guidance relates the FMI Annex’s inclusion of clearinghouse equity
holders as within the NCWOL safeguard. However, neither document
explains nor justifies why this safeguard, which by its very name is for
creditors, should be extended to equity.
If CCP equity is only responsible for losses or only loss absorbing
once all of a clearinghouse’s rules and arrangements for recovery have
been exhausted, then it is unclear that it would ever be responsible for any
default losses at all. The exception would be any equity placed in the
default waterfall. The Guidance notes that “[t]he [Principles for Financial
Market Infrastructures] call for a CCP to have in place comprehensive loss
allocation arrangements for default losses.”64 “These recovery procedures
are expected to manage most, if not all, difficulties faced by a CCP.”65
Recovery arrangements generally allocate default losses to clearing
members. Predictably, clearinghouses support adherence to rulebook loss
allocations.66 When pushed to their limits, recovery arrangements should,
in theory, return a clearinghouse to stability and a matched book or
facilitate an unwind (essentially, liquidation) of the clearinghouse. As
commentators have noted: “[i]t is not at all clear what a hypothetical
Id.
Id.
65 Edmonds, supra note 52.
66 See CME GRP., GUIDANCE ON FIN. RES. TO SUPPORT CCP RESOLUTION AND ON
THE TREATMENT OF CCP EQUITY IN RESOLUTION (July 31, 2020) (available at
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/CME-Group-3.pdf).
63
64
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insolvency looks like for a CCP whose balance sheet would not in fact be
insolvent following assumed application of its rulebook-the proceeding
would likely be more akin to a solvent wind-down of business.”67
Clearinghouse equity should absorb at least some non-default losses. The
rulebook might require clearing members to assume responsibility for
some non-default losses. However, it is not at all clear that it would be
possible to effectively separate default and non-default losses should they
occur simultaneously.
The FSB states that enabling shareholders to raise NCWOL claims
may lead to a result that “may be inconsistent with the other Key
Attributes principle that equity should be fully loss absorbing in resolution.
This may also raise moral hazard concerns by allowing equity holders to
maintain their equity interest in a CCP post resolution while participants
are made to bear losses.”68 The FSB highlights a critical inconsistency that
should be resolved as it cannot be reconciled. Market participants have
commented that:
Policymakers and market participants have now spent several
years discussing and struggling to reconcile the FSB’s extension
of the NCWO safeguard to CCP equity and the requirement for
comprehensive loss allocation in recovery with the FSB’s
principle that equity should be fully loss-bearing and the
objective that no taxpayer funds be used to pay NCWO
compensation to equity. These things cannot be reconciled
(particularly in a scenario in which the RA enters early), and the
FSB should either accept this fact or revise the safeguard so that
it does not extend to CCP equity.69

The Guidance also underscores the moral hazard risk involved in shielding
equity from default losses. It recommends that RAs consider “adjust[ing]
the exposure of CCP equity to losses,” mechanisms for doing this, and
“additional options to address the identified limitations” to equity being
fully loss absorbing in resolution.70

67 Memorandum from Allen & Overy on Proposed CCP Recovery & Resolution
Regulation to ISDA (Apr. 2, 2020) (available at https://www.isda.org/a/AD9TE/AOMemo-for-ISDA-NCWO-CCP-Equity.pdf).
68 FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 10.
69 FUTURES INDUS. ASS’N ET AL., supra note 14, at 28.
70 FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 10.
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IV. PART III: NCWOL CLAIMS SHOULD BE UNAVAILABLE
TO CLEARINGHOUSE SHAREHOLDERS
Not surprisingly, clearinghouses generally support the possibility of
NCWOL claims for shareholders in resolution71 while members do not.72
Market participants have asked for a justification for extending the
NCWOL safeguard to clearinghouse shareholders.73 Thus far, it does not
appear that either policymakers or clearinghouses have provided a clear
rationale.74 This Part argues that NCWOL claims should be unavailable to
clearinghouse shareholders. They are not creditors and clearinghouses are
not banks. Extension of this safeguard to shareholders would increase
moral hazard and miss an important opportunity to promote the
rationalization of the clearinghouse ecosystem.
First, shareholders are not creditors. The distinction between these
constituencies is one of the most basic in finance. It is indisputable that
the acronym is “NCWOL,” and not “NSWOL,” which would be the
acronym for “no shareholder worse off than in liquidation.” If
clearinghouse shareholders want the right to make such claims, they
should make the case for it and use the appropriate acronym.
Second, protecting clearinghouse shareholders from loss in resolution
creates serious moral hazard and fairness issues. “CCPs have a unique
corporate structure[,]”75 which is the result of the “incomplete
demutualization”76 of formerly mutualized (member-owned) entities. This
anomalous, incomplete or hybrid structure is problematic because it
creates a foundational incentive conflict between shareholders and
clearing members. As scholars have noted, it is precarious, rife with moral
hazard, and should be rationalized.77
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no marketplace
precedent in which customers are largely responsible for losses created by
other customers, for losses created by the business itself, or required to
See, e.g., CME GRP., supra note 66.
See FUTURES INDUS. ASS’N ET AL., supra note 14.
73 Id. at 28.
74 CME GRP. supra note 66 (stating that “[c]onsistent with the FSB’s Key Attributes,
the NCWOL assessment to determine if creditors, in this case the CCP’s shareholders,
would have been worse off under resolution…”; yet shareholders and creditors are clearly
distinct).
75 FUTURES INDUS. ASS’N ET AL., supra note 14, at 3.
76 Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 20.
77 See generally Baker, supra note 2.
71
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assist the business should it become financially distressed. Risk should
follow reward, especially in the case of super-systemic, publicly traded,
for-profit institutions. If policymakers want clearinghouses to act like
“systemic risk monitors and managers,” their equity must be at stake in
resolution:78
It is unreasonable to expect clearinghouses to focus on systemic
risks if owners keep profits during the good times but, rather
than being extinguished, survive the worse times with their
rights to surplus income intact; that, of course, amounts to a
subsidy from members and users, and in some circumstances
potentially from taxpayers. Their incentives matter hugely to
preserving stability in the system, given they set the margin and
other requirements that shape the availability and use of
leverage in trading markets.79

Not exposing clearinghouse equity to loss in resolution also creates
fairness concerns. As commentators emphasize: “[w]hile profits in
business are privatized by the CCP equity holders, losses in recovery and
resolution will be socialized to clearing participants and in extremis the
tax-payer.”80 As further explained by commentators, it would be
inaccurate and “in contrast to basic corporate finance principles that
clearing participants are asked to ‘bail out’ a CCP, yet future profits that
the CCP would not have had without the support from clearing
participants go to the shareholders of the CCP.”81
Third, clearinghouses are not banks.82 The NCWOL safeguard
originated in the bank resolution context. Commentators argue that “the
insolvency counterfactual which is meaningful for banks does not easily
translate to CCPs, which achieve much of their financial robustness
through mutualized loss-sharing rather than own capital and also . . . have
rulebook powers that allow them to reduce/remove the realistic risk of
insolvency in a way that is not possible for banks.”83 Policymakers have

The Systemic Risk Council Letter, supra note 8.
Id.
80 FUTURES INDUS. ASS’N ET AL., supra note 14, at 16.
81 Id.
82 For a discussion of the differences between banks and clearinghouses, see Mark
Jozsef Manning & David Hughes, Central Counterparties and Banks: Vive La Difference, 4 J.
FIN. MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES 1–24 (2016).
83 Allen & Overy, supra note 67, at 4.
78
79
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also carefully distinguished clearinghouses from banks.84 Although
clearing members have called for higher levels of clearinghouse capital,85
clearinghouses have emphasized that they “manage risk; they do not
introduce risk.”86
Clearinghouses are, without question, in control of their risk models.
These decisions about risk impact the probability of their experiencing
default losses.87 Clearinghouses can increase members’ margin
requirements and default fund contributions to reduce this probability. If
clearinghouses were required to maintain higher levels of capital, they
would need to increase clearing fees to avoid a “return [on equity] less than
the cost of equity.”88 If prudential clearinghouse margin or capital
increases would discourage clearing or are uneconomic for the
clearinghouse, then the problem could be the current clearinghouse
ownership model itself.
Finally, as the author has argued elsewhere, the clearinghouse
ecosystem, specifically the ownership of clearinghouses, should be
rationalized.89 Otherwise, there is a significant risk of following a path
similar to that of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—who have been in
government conservatorship for more than twelve years—in the
clearinghouse context were a clearinghouse to become distressed or
insolvent.90 If it were credibly clear ex-ante that NCWOL claims would be
unavailable to clearinghouse shareholders in resolution, this preannounced restriction should impact shareholder incentives and promote
the rationalization of the nonsensical incentive structures in the
clearinghouse ecosystem.

See Robert T. Cox & Robert S. Steigerwald, A CCP is a CCP is a CCP, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper, FED. RESERVE BANK CHI. (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/policy-discussion-papers/2017/pdp-1.
85 See ABN AMRO Clearing et al., supra note 19.
86 Letter from Angelo Evangelou, Chief Policy Officer, Cboe Global Markets, to
Chair Quarles, Fin. Stability Bd.(July 31, 2020) (available at https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/Cboe-Global-Markets.pdf).
87 Turing, supra note 38.
88 Memorandum from European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH) on
Financial Resources to Support CCP Resolutions (July 2020) (available at
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/European-Association-of-CCP-ClearingHouses-1.pdf).
89 See generally Baker, supra note 2.
90 Id.
84

2021]

CLEARINGHOUSE SHAREHOLDERS AND CLAIMS

353

These incentive structures violate basic corporate finance principles in
at least two ways: 1) they separate risk from reward in largely allocating
responsibility for default losses to clearing members and clearinghouse
profits to shareholders; and 2) they expect customers to absorb losses
created by other customers and to forgo compensation for their financial
contribution. In any other context, such expectations would be
nonsensical. Although the historical evolution of exchanges and
clearinghouses from member-ownership to shareholder-ownership
explains the descriptive reality of many clearinghouses’ “incomplete
demutualization,” this does not necessitate normative acquiescence to the
status quo.
Although their emphasis differs, both clearinghouses and clearing
members seem to recognize that the global clearing ecosystem for
derivatives is rife with potentially problematic incentive structures.
Clearing members are concerned that not enough clearinghouse capital is
at risk to incentivize proper risk management by clearinghouses who are
themselves concerned that clearing members will not be incentivized to
cooperate in recovery absent being required to do so. The amount of time,
effort, and expense that have been invested—and likely will continue to
be invested—by global policymakers and market participants in trying to
manage fundamentally misaligned incentives would seem to be better
spent by accepting the need to rationalize these incentive structures and
formulating a gradual path forward. Making NCWOL claims unavailable
to clearinghouse shareholders would be an important step in this direction.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearinghouses and their shareholders want to be indistinguishable
from creditors and banks for purposes of NCWOL claims. Yet
clearinghouse shareholders do not want to be creditors nor do
clearinghouses want to be subject to bank regulation. Policymakers should
not allow clearinghouses to have their cake and to eat it too. The push by
clearinghouse shareholders to be treated as creditors for NCWOL
purposes is a canary in the coal mine warning of the ultimate fragility of
recovery arrangements in clearinghouse rulebooks due to the
dysfunctional incentive structures in much of the clearinghouse
ecosystem. Making NCWOL claims unavailable for clearinghouse
shareholders would be a step towards the much-needed rationalization of
this area.

